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Abstract
We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed
to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Characterizing
the model’s success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity.
Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability and prosperity. This is surprising because
of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence.
Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not
depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well defined topographical and political boundaries
separating groups. Mountains and lakes are an important part of the boundaries between sharply
defined linguistic areas. Political canton and circle (sub-canton) boundaries often separate religious
groups. Where such boundaries do not appear to be sufficient, we find that specific aspects of
the population distribution either guarantee sufficient separation or sufficient mixing to inhibit
intergroup violence according to the quantitative theory of conflict. In exactly one region, a porous
mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and violent conflict has led to the
recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between
groups can be inhibited by physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the
former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did
not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where
they did coincide. The success of peace in Switzerland may serve as a model to resolve conflict in
other ethnically diverse countries and regions of the world.
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Achieving peace requires a vision of what it looks like. How we imagine peace affects
the steps we take and our ability to implement it in diverse locations around the world.
Does peace in one place look the same as in another? Is knowledge of the specifics of each
conflict necessary to negotiate peace between ethnic groups in conflict? Even if specifics are
important, there are broad frameworks that guide our thinking. Recently, we introduced a
complex systems theory of ethnic conflict that describes the conflicts in areas of the former
Yugoslavia and India with high accuracy [1]. In this theory, specific details of history, social
and economic conditions are not the primary conditions for peace or conflict. Instead the
geographic arrangement of populations is key. Significantly, it points to two distinct con-
ditions that are conducive to peace—well mixed and well separated. The first corresponds
to the most commonly striven for framework of an integrated society [2]. The second corre-
sponds to spatial separation, partition and self determination—a historically used but often
reviled approach [3]. Here we consider a more subtle third approach, that of within-state
boundaries in which cooperation and separation are both necessary. The success of this
approach is of particular importance as the world becomes more connected. As illustrated
by the European Union, the role of borders as boundaries is changing.
In order to evaluate the role of within-state boundaries in peace, we considered the
coexistence of groups in Switzerland. Switzerland is known as a country of great stability,
without major internal conflict despite multiple languages and religions [4,5]. Switzerland
is not a well-mixed society, it is heterogeneous geographically in both language and religion
(Fig. 1). The alpine topography and the federal system of strong cantons have been noted as
being relevant to coexistence; their importance can be seen in Napoleon’s statement, after the
failure of his centralized Helvetic Republic, that “nature” had made Switzerland a federation
[6–8]. But the existence of both alpine and non-alpine boundaries between groups and the
presence of multiple languages and religions within individual cantons suggest partition is
not essential for peaceful coexistence in Switzerland. In identifying the causes of peace, the
literature has focused on socio-economic and political conditions including a long tradition
of mediation and accommodation, social cleavages that “cross-cut” the population rather
than coincide with each other, unwritten and written rights of proportionality (fairness)
and cultural protectionism, a federal system with strong sub-national units, a civil society
that fosters unity, direct democracy through frequent referenda, small size, historical time
difference between cleavage in language and religion, neutrality in international warfare, and
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FIG. 1: Maps of Switzerland showing the 2000 census proportion of (A) linguistic groups, (B)
Catholic and Protestant (Mercator projection).
economic prosperity [4–6,9–13]. Geography plays an unclear, presumably supporting, role in
these frameworks. The analysis of coexistence in Switzerland is also part of a broader debate
about whether social and geographical aspects of federalism promote peace or conflict [15].
In this paper we analyze the geographical distribution of groups in Switzerland based
solely upon the hypothesis that spatial patterns formed by ethnic groups are predictive of
unrest and violence among them [1]. The theory asserts that highly mixed regions or well-
segregated groups are peaceful, while groups of a certain intermediate geographical size are
likely to engage in violence. While effective separation may be achieved when group areas
are large enough, the model also allows that topographic or political boundaries may serve
as separations to promote peace [1,16]. Using the case of Switzerland, we test the ability
of the theory to predict peaceful coexistence in the context of internal country boundaries.
Where explicit boundaries do not exist, such as in mixed cantons where alpine boundaries
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are absent, violence might be expected, and the results of the model in these areas serve as
a particularly stringent test of the theory. In most cases violence is not predicted, consistent
with what is found. In one area a significant level of violence is predicted, and violence is
actually observed. The analysis sheds light on the example of Switzerland as a model for
peaceful coexistence. The former Yugoslavia serves as a contrasting example of widespread
violence. The theory correctly identifies areas of conflict and areas of peace also in the
former Yugoslavia. The precision of the results provides some assurance of the usefulness of
the theory in planning interventions that might promote peace in many areas of the world.
The geographical distribution theory [1] considers type separation into geographical do-
mains independent of the specification of the individual types—a universality of type behav-
ior in collective violence. Violence arises due to the structure of boundaries between groups
rather than as a result of inherent conflicts between the groups themselves. In this approach,
diverse social and economic causal factors trigger violence when the spatial population struc-
ture creates a propensity to conflict, so that spatial heterogeneity itself is predictive of local
violence. The local ethnic patch size serves as an “order parameter,” a measure of the degree
of order of collective action, to which other aspects of behavior are coupled. The importance
of collective behavior implies that ethnic violence can be studied in the universal context of
collective dynamics, where models can identify how individual and collective behavior are
related.
The analysis is applicable to communal violence and not to criminal activity or interstate
warfare. In highly mixed regions, groups of the same type are not large enough to develop
strong collective identities, or to identify public spaces as associated with one or another
cultural group. They are neither imposed upon nor impose upon other groups, and are not
perceived as a threat to the cultural values or social/political self-determination of other
groups. Partial separation with poorly defined boundaries fosters conflict. Violence arises
when groups are of a geographical size that they are able to impose cultural norms on public
spaces, but where there are still intermittent violations of these rules due to the overlap of
cultural domains. When groups are larger than the critical size, they typically form self-
sufficient entities that enjoy local sovereignty. Hence, we expect violence to arise when groups
of a certain characteristic size are formed, and not when groups are much smaller or larger
than this size. The model of violence depends on the distribution of the population and not
on the specific mechanism by which the population achieves this structure, which may include
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internally or externally directed migrations. By focusing on the geographic distribution of
the population, the model seeks a predictor of conflict that can easily be determined by
census. This may work well because geography is an important aspect of the dimensions of
social space, and other aspects of social behavior (e.g., isolationism, conformity, as well as
violence) are correlated to it.
Physical boundaries such as mountain ranges and lakes or national and subnational polit-
ical boundaries that establish local autonomy may prevent the violations of cultural norms
and enable self-determination, inhibiting the triggers of violence. By creating autonomous
domains of activity and authority, the boundaries shield groups of the characteristic size
from each other when they correspond with their geographical domains.
Mathematically, evaluation of the model begins by mapping census data onto a spatial
grid. We included the fraction of every population type on each site. The expected violence
is determined by detecting patches consisting of islands or peninsulas of one type surrounded
by populations of other types. These features are detected by pattern recognition using the
correlation of the population for each population type with a template that has a positive
center and a negative surround. The template used is based on a wavelet filter [1,17,18].
Wavelets are designed to obtain a local measure of the degree to which a certain scale of
variation (wavelength) is present. Outcomes are highly robust, and other templates give
similar results. The diameter of the positive region of the wavelet, i.e., the size of the local
population patches that are likely to experience violence, is the only essential parameter of
the model. The parameter is to be determined by agreement of the model with reports of
violence, and results were robust to varying the parameter across a wide range of values. To
model the effect of boundaries, we assume that separate autonomous regions can be analyzed
by including only the populations within each of the autonomous areas to determine the
expected violence. Where boundaries are incomplete, as might be the case for mountains,
lakes and convoluted political boundaries, we include only the populations that are in line
of sight through gaps or past ends of boundaries to determine the expected violence within
a region. An effective map of populations at each site is constructed, determined by the
orientation of any boundaries relative to that site. Populations past boundaries of the line
of sight are replaced by neutral populations. The result of the correlation of population with
the wavelet filter is a single value at every location, the theoretical “propensity to violence,”
and the locations of expected violence are obtained by applying a threshold to that value.
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The location of groups of a certain size is indicative of a violence-prone group, but the
precise location of violence is not determined. The proximity of these violence-prone groups
to actual violence is tested by constructing proximity maps. The proximity to reported
violence is correlated to the proximity to violence prone groups. The model was validated
without boundaries [1] by applying it to the former Yugoslavia, yielding correlations of up
to 0.89. The results were robust to varying the characteristic length between 18–60 km.
Our revised method with fractional population values on every site gave similar results with
correlations of up to 0.87. (Methods are further described in the Appendix.)
We now consider the linguistic (Fig. 2) and religious (Fig. 3) groups in Switzerland,
each in turn. Initial analyses and the sequence of historical boundary formation suggested
considering topographical barriers when discussing language groups, and political barriers
when considering religious groups. The geography of languages primarily reflects the extent
of invasions prior to the existence of current political boundaries and has remained stable in
most areas for over a thousand years [5]. The modern state was established afterwards, and
religious conflict played a role in establishing the internal political boundaries [5–7]. Cen-
sus data were obtained for 2634 municipalities (communes) in Switzerland (bfs.admin.ch),
yielding a high spatial resolution.
Language and topographical barriers - We study the three main language groups—German,
French and Italian (Fig. 3A)—which together comprise 91% of the total population in
the 2000 census (Romansh, the fourth official language, accounts for less than 2%). We
considered only the effect of physical boundaries due to lakes and mountain ranges (Fig. 3,
B and C). We determined the presence of topographical boundaries using an edge detection
algorithm on topographical heights (Fig. 3D). This process identifies where there is a sharp
change in height, i.e., a cliff, or steep incline, that runs for a significant distance forming a
natural boundary. Elevation data with a spatial resolution of approximately 91m [19] was
coarsened to pixels of size 9.1 × 9.1 km. Edges were identified where there was an increase
of more than 1.8 km in height over a distance of 9.1 km (11.5◦) using a discretized Laplacian
differential operator [20] with a mask size of a single pixel. The conclusions are robust to
variations in the elevation angle (Appendix). Calculations of the propensity to violence are
reported here (Fig. 3, E and F) for the characteristic length of 24 km and in the Appendix
for a range of characteristic lengths. Without boundaries, the correlation of the wavelet filter
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FIG. 2: Maps of Switzerland showing (A) proportion of linguistic groups according to the 2000
census, (B) elevation within Switzerland, (C) overlay of linguistic groups onto a digital elevation
model, and (D) topographical features including lakes (blue) and ridges extracted using edge
detection (cyan). Comparison of calculated propensity (color bar) to violence between linguistic
groups without (E) and with (F) the inclusion of topographical features as boundaries using a
characteristic length scale of 24 km. Mercator projection, except C which is the Europe Albers
projection. The distance scale is approximate.
yields a maximum propensity to violence value of 0.48. With topographical boundaries the
maximum propensity is reduced to 0.30. Between the German and French-speaking areas to
the northwest, the Jura mountain range and Lake Neuchatel, and to the south, the Bernese
Alps, are mitigating boundaries. The interface between Lake Neuchatel and the Bernese
Alps through the canton of Fribourg has no mitigating boundary, but is almost straight—
neither side is surrounded by the other, so the propensity is low. Between the Italian and
German-speaking areas, the Lepontine Alps dramatically reduce the calculated propensity.
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The Jura range is, however, a porous boundary, and the highest residual propensity is
adjacent to it in the northwest of the canton of Bern, which, unique in Switzerland, is
historically known to be an area of “intense” linguistically-based conflict, including arson,
bombings and other terrorist tactics [13,21]. We obtained a correlation higher than 0.95
between predicted and reported violence (Appendix), consistent with the hypothesis of the
model. Manifesting Swiss willingness to create political boundaries, the conflict led to a
referendum, and in 1978 the modern-day canton of Jura was created out of part of the
north of what was then the canton of Bern [7]. While the conflict underlying the unrest was
linguistic, local votes led to separation by majority religion. However, conflict did not end,
and a proposal to shift the French-speaking Protestant areas of Bern to join French-speaking
Catholic Jura is currently being considered [22]. Our results suggest that a calculated
propensity to violence of 0.3 should be considered just at the threshold for actual violence,
even under the social and political conditions prevailing in Switzerland. Remarkably, at
this threshold high correlations (above 0.8) also are found in the former Yugoslavia. Thus,
similar propensities for violence in different social contexts result in violence.
Religious Groups and Political Barriers - The two main religious groups of Switzerland
are Protestant and Catholic. The Swiss federal political system separates the country into
26 “cantons” and “half-cantons” considered as semi-autonomous political units (Fig. 3).
Moreover, this schema is repeated within the largest canton by area, Graubu¨nden, whose
sub-cantonal divisions called circles (kreise) have a distinctive political autonomy [4,12]. We
obtained canton boundaries from mapping resources (www.gadm.org, www.toposhop.admin.
ch). Circles boundaries were identified by district lists (www.gis.gr.ch). In the 2000 census,
Roman Catholic and Protestant affiliations account for 77% of the total population. Less
than 8% subscribe to other religions, and the remainder have no religious affiliation or did
not specify one. Without boundaries, the maximum calculated propensity to violence is
very high (0.57), and with political borders it is only 0.20. Without Graubu¨nden circles,
the propensity increases to a quite high 0.42, still well above the threshold. Because of a
10% decline in religious affiliation in recent years, we considered also the 1990 census, with
similar conclusions (Appendix).
The separation of religions by canton is apparent geographically and historically. In
some cases the area of a canton includes small enclaves embedded in another canton whose
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FIG. 3: Maps of Switzerland (Mercator projection) showing (A) proportion of Catholic (yel-
low) and Protestant (blue) according to the 2000 census, (B) cantons, (C) and (D) cantons
(and Graubu¨nden circles) that are majority Protestant and Catholic respectively, using the same
color map as A. Comparison of propensity to violence between religious groups without (E) and
with (F) the inclusion of administrative boundaries using a characteristic length scale of 24 km.
Propensity value scale is shown by color bar. Canton abbreviations are GE: Gene`ve, SO: Solothurn,
ZG: Zug,VL: Valais, BS: Basel-Stadt, GL: Glarus, VD: Vaud, BL: Basel-Landschaft, TI: Ticino,
NE: Neuchatel, AR: Aargau, GR: Graubu¨nden, FR: Fribourg, LU: Lucerne, App-A: Appenzell-
Ausserhoden, BE: Bern, OB: Obwalden, App-I: Appenzell-Innerrhoden, JU: Jura, NI: Nidwalden,
StG: St. Gallen, UR: Uri, SF: Schaffhausen, TH: Thurgau, SZ: Schwyz, ZU: Zurich.
majority religion corresponds to the canton to which they belong. Still, there are exceptions
to the separation of religions by canton. In each case the geography is sufficient to limit
the propensity to violence. For example, there is an area of Protestant majority in the far
north of the Catholic canton of Fribourg. It is, however on a long appendage and therefore
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is not surrounded by Catholic areas, and so has a low propensity to violence according to
the analysis. Historical evidence is found in conflict in the 1500s [7]. The Reformation led
to cantons adopting a Protestant or retaining a Catholic identity. A brief war resulted in a
peace treaty that established religious freedom by canton. The canton Appenzell was split
by religious differences into two “half-cantons” Innerrhoden and Ausserrhoden. The political
independence of circles (kreise) in Graubu¨nden also provided religious autonomy [12]. The
intentional formation of political boundaries in regions that would have violence according
to the model, and the subsequent model propensity below the threshold associated to a lack
of actual violence are consistent with the hypothesis on the role of boundaries in peaceful
coexistence.
Yugoslavia - Our modified method including boundaries was tested on the previous case
study of Yugoslavia, consisting of the combined area of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro. Topographical boundaries reduce the maximum propensity from 0.63 to 0.57, and
administrative borders to 0.56. The correlations of predicted and reported violence changes
were insignificantly lower, with correlations of 0.86 and 0.85, respectively. That political
boundaries do not have a greater impact on the calculated violence implies that they do
not align with the geographical boundaries between groups. We also extended the area to
include Macedonia and Slovenia, parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before
gaining independence (Fig. 4). With the political boundaries the correlation is still 0.85;
however, when political boundaries are not included, the correlation is reduced considerably
to 0.72. The lower correlation is specifically due to a high calculated propensity to vio-
lence along the borders of Slovenia with Croatia, and of Macedonia with Serbia and Kosovo.
These areas, however, were peaceful—consistent with the predictions when boundaries are
included. Our results suggest that these political borders were instrumental in reducing
ethnic violence, whereas the violence in other areas of Yugoslavia was not prevented because
of poor alignment of borders with population groups.
This work is part of a broader effort to use new methods for quantitative analysis of
patterns of violence and their prevention [23–31]. There is also interest in ethnic group
interactions across national borders [32-34]. We have shown that groups that are not well-
mixed but are geographically separated by natural or political boundaries into autonomous
domains are peaceful in both Switzerland and the former Yugoslavia. Our work clarifies
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FIG. 4: (A) Map of the area of the former Yugoslavia showing administrative provinces. Propen-
sity to violence calculated without (B) and with (C) administrative boundaries, using a character-
istic length of 21 km. Locations of boundaries are shown on both plots as solid and dashed yellow
lines respectively. Sites of reported violence are shown as red dots [18]. Spurious violence is pre-
dicted along the borders of Slovenia and Macedonia when boundaries are not included. Province
labels are: SL: Slovenia, CR: Croatia, VO: Vojvodina*, B&H: Bosnia & Herzegovina, SR: Ser-
bia, MN: Montenegro, KO: Kosovo*, MA: Macedonia. (*Autonomous administrative provinces of
Serbia.)
the ambiguities of mixed language and religion Swiss cantons by showing that in most cases
the natural geography of the populations conspires to lead to a low level of violence, so
that additional boundaries were not necessary; where they were needed, as in Graubu¨nden,
they were established. The highest calculated propensity to violence is between linguistic
groups in the northern part of the canton of Bern, where historically unresolved real world
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tensions actually exist. Our analysis indicates that both administrative and natural barriers
can play a significant role in mitigating conflict between religious and linguistic groups.
Historical evidence suggests that for religious groups the boundaries in Switzerland were
created to provide autonomy to a group with a shared identity and avoid conflict among
multiple groups. Ongoing efforts to reduce tensions in Bern include introducing new political
boundaries. The many political, social and economic factors that play roles in reducing
violence [4–6,9–14] build on a strong foundation of geographical borders. Our analysis
suggests that when partition within a country is viewed as an acceptable form of conflict
mitigation, such partition can give rise to highly stable coexistence and peace.
We thank Stuart Pimm, Irving Epstein and Lawrence Susskind for helpful comments on
the manuscript, Michael Widener and Blake Stacey for help with a figure and formatting.
This work was supported in part by AFOSR under grant FA9550-09-1-0324 and ONR under
grant N000140910516.
References:
[1] M. Lim, R. Metzler, Y. Bar-Yam, Global pattern formation and ethnic/cultural vio-
lence. Science 317, 1540 (2007).
[2] Imagine Coexistence: Restoring humanity after violent ethnic conflict, A. Chayes, M.
L. Minow eds., (Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 2003)
[3] C. Kaufmann, When all else fails: Ethnic population transfers and partitions in the
Twentieth Century. Int. Secur. 23, 120 (1998).
[4] A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (Yale Uni-
versity Press, New Haven, 1977).
[5] C. L. Schmid, Conflict and Consensus in Switzerland (University of California Press,
Berkeley, 1981).
[6] W. Martin, A History of Switzerland: An Essay on the Formation of a Confederation
of States (G. Richards, London, 1931).
[7] U. Im Hof, Geschichte der Schweiz, vol. 188 of Kohlhammer Urban-Taschenbu¨cher
(Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1991).
[8] N. Bonaparte, Proclamation de St. Cloud, 30 septembre 1802 in Bonaparte et la
Suisse: Travaux Preparatoires de l’Acte de Mediation (1803), V. Monnier, Ed. (Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, Geneva, 2002).
12
[9] J. Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzer-
land (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1974).
[10] H. E. Glass, Ethnic diversity, elite accommodation and federalism in Switzerland.
Publius 7, 31 (1977).
[11] W. Linder, Swiss Democracy: Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York, ed. 3, 2010).
[12] R. C. Head, Early Modern Democracy in the Grisons: Social Order and Political
Language in a Swiss Mountain Canton: 1470–1620 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2002).
[13] K. D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies: Switzerland (Wil-
frid Laurier University Press, Waterloo, Ontario, 1983).
[14] C. H. Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland (Palgrave MacMillian,
New York, 2004).
[15] T. Christin, S. Hug, Federalism, the geographic location of groups, and conflict, CIS
Working Paper No. 23, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and
University of Zurich (2006).
[16] W. Shearer, Determine Indicators for Conflict Avoidance, Science (2008)
[17] P. Ch. Ivanov et al., Nature 383, 323 (1996).
[18] I. Daubechies, Ten Lectures on Wavelets, (SIAM, Philadelphia, 1992).
[19] A. Jarvis, H. I. Reuter, A. Nelson, E. Guevara, Hole-filled SRTM Version 4: http:
//srtm.csi.cgiar.org (2008).
[20] A. Bovik, Essential Guide to Image Processing (Academic Press, Burlington, 2009).
[21] W. R. Keech, Linguistic diversity and political conflict: Some observations based on
four Swiss cantons. Comp. Politics 4, 387 (1972).
[22] “Citizens to settle territorial Jura conflict,” Swissinfo, May 4, 2009
(http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/Citizens_to_settle_territorial_Jura_
conflict.html?cid=7377228, Accessed Feb. 21, 2011).
[23] D. L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (University of California Press, Berkeley,
ed. 2, 2000).
[24] B. Harff, T. R. Gurr, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Westview, Boulder, ed. 2,
2004).
[25] M. Reynal-Querol, Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. J. Conflict Res. 46,
13
29 (2002).
[26] J. Fox, Religion, Civilization, and Civil War: 1945 Through the New Millennium
(Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, 2004).
[27] I. S. Lustick, D. Miodownik, R. J. Eidelson, Secessionism in multicultural states:
Does sharing power prevent or encourage it? Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 98, 209 (2004).
[28] T. R. Gulden, Spatial and temporal patterns in civil violence: Guatemala, 1977-1986.
Politics Life Sciences 21, 26 (2002).
[29] L. E. Cederman, K. S. Gleditsch, Introduction to special issue on “Disaggregating
Civil War.” J. Conflict Res. 53, 487 (2009).
[30] H. Buhaug, S. Gates, The geography of civil war. J. Peace Res. 39, 417 (2002).
[31] J. C. Bohorquez, S. Gourley, A. R. Dixon, M. Spagat, N. F. Johnson, Common
ecology quantifies human insurgency. Nature 462, 911 (2009).
[32] African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, P. Nugent, A. I. Asiwaju,
eds. (Pinter, London, 1996).
[33] K. Mitchell, Transnational discourse: bringing geography back in, Antipode 29, 101
(1997).
[34] M. Silberfein, A. Conteh, Boundaries and conflict in the Mano River region of West
Africa, Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, 343 (2006).
14
Appendices for: Good Fences:
The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence
Contents
A. Methods 15
1. Identifying the propensity to violence using a wavelet filter 15
2. Boundaries 16
3. Empty sites 17
B. Census data 18
C. Summary of model comparisons with the data 19
D. Languages 20
E. Elevation edges 21
F. Religion (2000 census) 23
G. Religion (1990 census) 26
H. Bern/Jura violence 29
I. Yugoslavia 32
J. Expanded bibliography on ethnic conflict 35
Appendix A: Methods
1. Identifying the propensity to violence using a wavelet filter
The potential for conflict is quantified in our model using a wavelet filter [A.1–A.3]. In
essence, the filter evaluates the extent of the presence of a type in a circular area with a
specified radius and subtracts from this the presence of the same type in a surrounding area.
This results in cancellation if the same type is located in the surrounding area. Other types
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are all treated with the opposite sign causing cancellation if there are mixed populations of
the first type with the others. Thus, the largest values are obtained for an island of one
type surrounded by other types. Large values are also obtained for a peninsula of one type
into a sea of other types. To evaluate the likelihood of violence at a particular location, we
apply the filter, centered at that location, for each of the types. The likelihood of violence in
that region is the maximum over all types. Unlike the earlier method [A.4], we included all
population types on each site of a grid rather than basing calculations on an agent model.
Mathematically the expression for the filter applied at a location (x, y), with the maximum
taken over all types, is
c(x, y) = max
s
∑
x′,y′
m(x− x′, y − y′)
(
ps(x
′, y′)−
∑
s′ 6=s
ps′(x
′, y′)
)
, (A1)
which is a convolution of the fraction of the population of one type, ps(x, y) minus the
fractional population of other types, with a wavelet,
m(x, y) = (1− ρ(x, y)2)e−ρ(x,y)2 , (A2)
where the scaled distance from the center is given by
ρ(x, y) =
√
x2 + y2
rc
, (A3)
the Euclidean distance divided by the radius of the wavelet, rc, which is half of the diameter,
lc, the model parameter identifying the size of groups that are likely to engage in conflict.
The value of c(x, y) serves as a measure of the likelihood of violence in the vicinity of the
location (x, y). When performing statistical tests on the prediction of violence, we specify
a threshold that distinguishes regions of violence from regions of non-violence according to
whether c(x, y) exceeds the specified threshold.
2. Boundaries
We model both topographical and administrative boundaries within a country as prevent-
ing intergroup violence across them, similar to national boundaries in the earlier method
[A.4]. A cliff separating a plateau from a plain is considered to be a barrier to movement
between the upper and lower areas and thus serves as a boundary.
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We generalize the previous method for incorporating boundaries to allow for partial
boundaries and boundaries with gaps. Partial boundaries between areas within the country
can arise due to mountains, lakes, or at convoluted political borders. For such boundaries, we
consider the line of sight from a given location to identify the populations which impact on
the propensity for violence at that location. Populations outside of the line of sight are not
included as contributing to violence. Thus an effective map of populations as experienced at
each site is constructed, determined by the specific orientation of any boundaries relative to
that site. The areas which are blocked from sight are populated with a neutral population,
the existing local proportions of the population. This better matches both the mixed and
single type local populations than a single type. The local proportions were measured within
a range of two characteristic lengths (wavelet diameters) of each site, considering only sites
that are in a line of sight.
3. Empty sites
Some small areas are unpopulated. These and lake areas were treated as other sites, but
the violence at these sites was set to zero. Only small differences arise if these unpopulated
areas are treated differently.
There are two types of unpopulated areas, land and water. Unpopulated land areas
are treated as other land areas for the purpose of the calculations. After the calculation
we set the propensity to violence in those locations to zero. The results were not affected
significantly (Fig. A.1). Water areas were treated similarly, with the exception that bodies
of water that are large were considered to be topographical barriers, similar to mountains
and cliffs. Specifically, we included the two largest lakes, Leman and Neuchatel, both of
which have a length above 10 km, which is comparable to the range of characteristic length
scales used to detect a propensity to violence.
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FIG. A.1: Level of predicted violence between linguistic groups in Switzerland using a charac-
teristic length scale of 24 km. Each panel represents results for a different treatment of lakes and
unpopulated land areas: (A) including lakes and unpopulated land areas as empty sites; (B)
including as barriers the lakes of Leman and Neuchatel; (C) interpolating a composition for all
unpopulated sites from neighboring sites.
[A.4] M. Lim, R. Metzler, Y. Bar-Yam, Global pattern formation and ethnic/cultural
violence. Science 317, 1540 (2007).
Appendix B: Census data
The commune composition used in our calculations was based on the census of 2000
and 1990 published by the Swiss Statistical Office. Where municipalities have merged, an
aggregate of their previous constituent municipalities was taken. Three official languages we
considered are French, German and Italian, which comprise 91% of the total population. The
fourth official language, Romansch, is 2%. The religions considered are Roman Catholic and
Protestant accounting for 77% of the total with less than 8% belonging to other religious
groups and the remainder not subscribing to a religion or not specifying one. The 1990
census data is only readily available on a cantonal level. As described in Section G, we
estimated the commune composition using the 2000 value and the change in the parent
canton between 1990 and 2000.
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Appendix C: Summary of model comparisons with the data
We briefly summarize the comparisons between model predictions and the observed data
reported in the main section of the paper.
Our examination of linguistic and religious groups in Switzerland highlighted cases where
violence is predicted without the presence of boundaries, but is mitigated by the considera-
tion of topographical and political boundaries appropriate to linguistic and religious groups,
respectively.
(1) Topographical boundaries reduced violence between linguistic groups. This occurred
along (a) Alpine boundaries of the Swiss Alps between German-speaking and Italian-
speaking populations, (b) Alpine boundaries between German-speaking and French-speaking
populations, and (c) Jura range boundaries between German-speaking and French-speaking
populations.
(2) Political boundaries reduced violence between religious groups. This is the case both
for (a) canton boundaries and for (b) circle boundaries in the canton of Graubu¨nden.
Our analysis also identified locations in which our model does not predict violence despite
linguistic or religious heterogeneity and no explicit boundaries.
(3) The straightness of the boundary prevents violence between linguistic groups in Fri-
bourg/Freiburg.
(4) Isolation of a Protestant population on an appendage from the Catholic majority
prevents violence in Fribourg/Freiburg.
We also identified one area at the highest level of calculated residual propensity to violence
and it corresponds to an area of unresolved historical conflict.
(5) The northeastern part of the canton of Bern is the location of both the highest
prediction of propensity to violence, and a real-world history of intergroup tension. The
unique condition of the conflict in this part of Switzerland and its correspondence to the
prediction by the model provides additional confirmation of the model.
Considering the predicted and reported violence in the former Yugoslavia also demon-
strated the importance of the boundaries which coincide with ethnic divisions.
(6) Political boundaries between Slovenia and Macedonia and the other countries of the
former Yugoslavia prevent violence along their borders.
(7) The borders between the countries of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro were
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FIG. D.1: Maximum level of the propensity to violence between linguistic groups in Switzerland as
calculated in the model as a function of the characteristic length scale. The calculation is performed
with effect of topographical boundaries (•) and without effect of topographical boundaries (♦).
not aligned with the boundaries between ethnic groups and so were ineffective at reducing
violence.
Appendix D: Languages
Here we describe in greater detail the results of the calculation of the propensity to vio-
lence between linguistic groups in Switzerland with and without the effect of topographical
boundaries. In the main text we described the calculation of propensity for violence for
a characteristic length scale of 24 km. Here we provide it for the length scales 24, 32, 40,
48 and 56 km. Figs. D.1–D.3 show that, at all values of the characteristic length scale,
the propensity for violence is high for calculations without topographical boundaries and is
dramatically reduced by their inclusion.
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FIG. D.2: Level of propensity to violence between linguistic groups in Switzerland including the
effect of topographical boundaries. Characteristic lengths increases from left to right, top to bottom
with the values 24, 32, 40, 48, 56 km.
FIG. D.3: As in Fig. D.2 without the effect of topographical boundaries.
Appendix E: Elevation edges
Here we investigate the robustness of our analysis to variation of the calculation of to-
pographical barriers extracted from the elevation data. We vary the gradient threshold
that determines the presence of a boundary and compare the results for linguistic groups
in Switzerland. We also include here a similar comparison of the calculation of the impact
of topographical edges on the conflict between ethnic groups within the former Yugoslavia.
Figure E.1 shows the variation of the maximum propensity to violence in Switzerland as the
threshold gradient for geographical barriers varies. The propensity is robust to the varia-
tion across a range of angles. Still, as the gradient increases and barriers are removed the
propensity to violence increases. The model results are consistent with the expectation that
it is necessary to include geographical features as barriers in order to achieve agreement
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FIG. E.1: The maximum propensity to violence between linguistic groups in Switzerland as the
threshold gradient for topographical barriers varies.
with the locations of actual reports of violence, and is consistent with the hypothesis that
such barriers are effective in mitigating outbreaks of violence. Figure E.2 shows the max-
imum propensity to violence calculated for the former Yugoslavia as a function of changes
in the gradient threshold, and the resulting correlation of predicted and reported violence.
The results show that while some variation in the maximum value of the predicted violence
propensity occurs, it remains above the threshold for expected violence. The correlation
with observed violence is not very sensitive to the gradient of the edges in elevation. This
indicates that areas of predicted violence continue to be proximate to the areas of reported
violence. Topographical features are not sufficiently steep or aligned with the boundaries of
population groups to inhibit violence.
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FIG. E.2: Maximum propensity to violence (×, left axis) and correlation of predicted with reported
violence (+, right axis) in the former Yugoslavia as the threshold gradient for topographical barriers
g varies.
Appendix F: Religion (2000 census)
Here we describe in greater detail the calculation of violence between religious groups in
Switzerland. In the main text we described the calculation of propensity for violence for a
characteristic length scale of 24 km. Here we provide the results for the length scales 24, 32,
40, 48 and 56 km.
Figure F.1 plots the maximum propensity to violence with canton and Graubu¨nden circle
boundaries, with canton boundaries only, and without political boundaries. The correspond-
ing maps are shown in Figs. F.2–F.4. Autonomy within cantons and Graubu¨nden circles has
been established to prevent conflict. Consistent with the historical experience, the model
results imply that without these boundaries violence would be expected, but with them it is
not. The effect of canton boundaries is important across all length scales, that of the circles
in Graubu¨nden is important at the smaller length scales. This result specifically suggests
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FIG. F.1: Maximum level of the propensity to violence between religious groups in Switzerland as
a function of characteristic length scale according to the model. Calculations are shown including
the effect of canton boundaries and Graubu¨nden circle boundaries (•), including the effect of canton
boundaries only (×), and without the effect of political boundaries (+). The dashed line represents
the inferred threshold of propensity of violence in order for violence to occur.
that length scales of 24–32 km correspond to a geographical group size that is susceptible to
violence.
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FIG. F.2: Level of predicted violence between religious groups in Switzerland with political bound-
aries, including both cantons and Graubu¨nden circles (2000 census). Characteristic length increases
from left to right, top to bottom for the values 24, 32, 40, 48, 56 km.
FIG. F.3: As in Fig. F.2 but including only the effect of canton boundaries.
FIG. F.4: As in Fig. F.2 but without the effects of political boundaries.
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Appendix G: Religion (1990 census)
In the main paper we reported the propensity for violence between religious groups for the
2000 census for the characteristic length of 24 km. During the 1990s there was a significant
reduction in religious affiliation. We therefore considered also the 1990 census. The results
are very similar to those of the 2000 census with maximum propensity without boundaries of
0.59 (compared to 0.57) reduced to 0.23 when including the political boundaries (compared
to 0.20).
In 2000 Roman Catholicism and Protestantism accounted for 87% of the population, 10%
more than in 2000, and with only 9.5% identifying themselves as atheist or not specifying
religious affiliation. The census for religions in Switzerland in 1990 is readily available only at
a canton level resolution rather than the municipality level used in our calculations. We used
the reduction of religious affiliation in the entire canton to estimate religious composition
for each municipality in 1990. Explicitly:
p = p′ × 1.0− βa
′
1.0− a′ , (G1)
where p and p′ are the value of the municipal Catholic or Protestant proportion of the pop-
ulation estimated for 1990 and given for 2000, a′ is the unaffiliated municipality population
proportion in 2000, and
β =
A
A′
(G2)
is the ratio of unaffiliated canton population proportions, A and A′, in 1990 and 2000. Fig.
G.1 is a map of the resulting religious affiliation. Figs. G.2–G.5 show the calculations of the
propensity for violence for the 1990 census corresponding to the results for the 2000 census
results shown in Fig. F.1–F.4.
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FIG. G.1: Proportion of religious groups according to interpolated 1990 census. Communes
are colored according to proportion of Protestant (blue) and Catholic (yellow) as shown by color
triangle.
FIG. G.2: As in Fig. F.1 for the 1990 census.
27
FIG. G.3: As in Fig. F.2 for the 1990 census.
FIG. G.4: As in Fig. F.3 for the 1990 census.
FIG. G.5: As in Fig. F.4 for the 1990 census.
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Appendix H: Bern/Jura violence
Unique in Switzerland in recent decades, the violence in the area of Bern/Jura based on
linguistic conflict included targeted arson and bombings and a violent encounter between
demonstrators. We performed an analysis of the correlation of reported violence with the
location of highest propensity calculated by the theory, which is reduced by local geography
compared to what would be expected without it. The resulting correlation is greater than
0.95. We note that the difficulty in relieving the conflict in the northern area of Bern is
consistent with an expectation that political boundaries are used for inter-religious rather
than inter-lingual conflict, for which purpose they may not be as well adapted.
Specific events, listed by location:
Glovelier - March 24, 1961, arson against a military arsenal. [H:1]; July 16, 1972, explosion
of a military arsenal. [H:2] (http://www.bijube.ch/page-7207.html)
Les Auges - October 21, 1962, arson against a military barracks. [H:3] (http://www.
bijube.ch/page-6210.html)
Bourrignon - March 26, 1963, arson against a military barracks. [H:3] (http://www.
bijube.ch/page-6303.html)
Genevez - April 28, 1963, arson against a farm. [H:3] (http://www.bijube.ch/
page-6304.html)
Montfaucon - July 18, 1963, arson against a farm. [H:3] (http://www.bijube.ch/
page-6307.html)
Mont-Soleil - October 5, 1963, a house bombing against a leader of an anti-separatist
group. [H:3,4] (http://www.bijube.ch/page-6310.html)
Malleray - December 23, 1963, a bombing of a property of an anti-separatist group leader.
[H:3]; October 20, 1987, arson against a shooting range. [H:5] (http://www.bijube.ch/
page-6312.html, http://www.bijube.ch/page-8509.html)
Studen - February 27, 1964, bombing of a railway line. [H:3,S8:6] (http://www.bijube.
ch/page-6402.html)
Delemont - March 12, 1964, bombing of a branch of the Cantonal Bank of Berne. [H:3] ;
March 4, 1966, government administration building attacked. [H:1] (http://www.bijube.
ch/page-6403.html)
Saignele´gier - November 20, 1965, arson against a hotel. [H:1]; On October 1, 1987,
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explosion of a munitions depot. [H:7] (http://www.bijube.ch/page-6511.html, http:
//www.bijube.ch/page-8710.html)
Mont-Crosin - May 29, 1966, arson against a hotel. [H:1] (http://www.bijube.ch/
page-6605.html)
Corte´bert - March 16, 1980, violent fighting between separatists and anti-separatists
with stones, firecrackers, and flare guns. Demonstrators on both sides were injured. [H:8]
(http://www.bijube.ch/page-8003.html)
Moutier - September 4, 1985 bombing of the district court. [H:9] (http://www.bijube.
ch/page-8509.html)
Reussilles - September 11 and 23, 1993, arson against a munitions depot. [H:7,H:5]
Perrefitte - October 21, 1987, bombing of a shooting range. [H:5] (http://www.bijube.
ch/page-8710.html)
Bu¨ren - April 5, 1989, arson against a historic wooden bridge. [H:10] (http://www.
bijube.ch/page-8509.html)
Montbautier - May 24, 1992, arson against a German-language school, previously van-
dalized. [H:11]
Courtelary - January 7, 1993, bombing of a house of an anti-separatist. [H:12,S8:13]
(http://www.bijube.ch/page-9301.html
Berne - January 7, 1993, premature explosion of a bomb in a car killing one person.
[H:13] (http://www.bijube.ch/page-9301.html)
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Appendix I: Yugoslavia
Figures showing the correlation of predicted and reported violence for the former Yu-
goslavia without administrative or topographical boundaries (Fig. I.1) with administrative
boundaries (Fig. I.2) and with topographical boundaries (Fig. I.3).
We also provide a similar analysis of the former Yugoslavia including Macedonia and
Slovenia, without (Fig. I.4) and with (Fig. I.5) political boundaries. Without political
boundaries the agreement of predicted and reported violence is dramatically reduced.
FIG. I.1: Correlation of proximity maps of predicted and reported violence in Yugoslavia without
topographical or political boundaries, as a function of threshold for violence divided by the maxi-
mum propensity for violence. Each curve is labelled by the characteristic length (km). (Compare
with Figure S4.3 in Ref. [14].)
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FIG. I.2: As in Fig. I.1 but including the effects of administrative boundaries.
FIG. I.3: As in Fig. I.1 but including topographical boundaries.
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FIG. I.4: As in Fig. I.1, but including Slovenia and Macedonia.
FIG. I.5: As in Fig. I.4 but including the effect of political boundaries.
34
Appendix J: Expanded bibliography on ethnic conflict
In recent years there have been increasing efforts to understand the causes and enabling
conditions for civil war and ethnic conflict. The attached bibliography [J:1–118] expands
on citations included in the main text and in supplementary materials of Ref. [14]. These
efforts include examinations of geography and other structures within countries [J:18–50]
as well as the effects of transnational geography [J:51–67]. Extensive analysis explores
the role of political structures, particularly federalism, in enabling or preventing civil
and ethnic conflict [J:68–89]. Research has begun to include quantitative studies and
modeling to understand human behavior and conflict [J:90–94]. A body of research exam-
ines Switzerland regarding the presence or absence of tensions and possible causes [J:95–118].
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